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IN THE SUPREMF. COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

.
.

-v-

JEFFERY DEAN BAKER,

Case No. 18245

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with burglary, a thirddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., S 76-6-2021 and
theft by receiving, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-408.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury which found him
guilty on both counts on January 4, 1982, in the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
presiding.

Appellant was sentenced on January 8, 1982 to an

indefinite term of zero to five years for the burglary count
and six months for the theft by receiving count.

The sentence

was stayed for 30 days while the Board of Pardons considered
whether the State Hospital program was appropriate for
appellant, and.judgment was finally entered February 10, 1982.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming
the trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant broke into a service station located at
904 south 1300 East in Salt Lake City at approximately 3:00
a.m. on September 18, 1981 (T. 24, 25).

A neighbor next door

heard the chain link fence rattle at about 2:45 a.m. (T. 24)
and about five minutes later heard a window break (T. 25).
The neighbor notified the police, who came to the station
within five or ten minutes (T. 27, 31).

The police contacted

the store owner, and when he arrived on the scene the officers
and the owner entered the station.

They "took a quick visual

check" (T. 16), noticed the padlock on the desk had been
broken, the desk drawer was open, and the contents of that
drawer were scattered around (T. 16).
At that time, appellant was hiding in a closet (T.
18).

During the next forty-five minutes (T. 18), the police

officers remained on the scene, making arrangements to tow
appellant's truck from the service station lot (T. 18).

The

owner then returned, entered the building, and heard a loud
noise (T. 18, 20).

He and the officers found appellant,

covered with dirty uniforms, hiding in the storage area behind
an air compressor (T. 18).

The police officer (T. 36), the

station owner (T. 18), and appellant himself (Appellant's
Brief, p. 2) all state that appellant was hiding.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although appellant did state that he was sleeping
(T. 37), and now claims he only entered the building to sleep,
the facts contradict this assertion.

First, rather than

sleeping, he made a loud noise which alerted the owner.
Second, if he was searching for a place to sleep, his home was
located between the service station and the place he left for
the night (T. 11, 52, 53, 56, 63).
Appellant does not appeal his conviction of theft by
receiving.

Appellant has been charged in the past with:

theft, 1977; burglary, 1978; illegal consumption of alcohol by
a minor, 1978; uttering a forged document, 1978; bench warrant
for speeding, 1978; burglary, 1979; carrying a concealed
weapon, 1979; criminal trespass and possession of burglary
tools, 1981 (R. 6-8).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CRIMINAL
TRESPASS.
In this case, appellant requested several jury
instructions based on criminal-trespass (R. 32-34, 37).

He

now claims that the trial court erred in refusing to give his
requested criminal trespass instructions.

First, according to

appellant, criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of
the crime of burglary.
defense theory.

Second, criminal trespass is his

Thus, appellant concludes he was entitled to
-3-
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a jury instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included
offense to burglary.
Appellate cites State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372,
463 P.2d 811, 814 (1970) for the proposition that an accused
is entitled to jury instruction on lesser included offenses
when they embody the theory on which he bases his defense.
However, Gillian further requires that all of the evidence
must be surveyed to see if "there is any reasonable basis
therein which would support a conviction of the lesser
offenses."

Respondent contends that on the facts herein,

there is not a reasonable basis in the evidence supporting a
conviction of criminal trespass, either as a lesser included
offense to burglary or as a separate offense.
A.

CRI~INAL TRESPASS IS NOT A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY.

In determining whether an offense is a lesser
included offense to another, this Court set forth the
following standard:
The rule as to when one offense is
included in another is that the greater
offense includes a lesser one when
establishment of the greater wOii'Id
necessarily include proof of all of the
elements necessary to prove the lesser.
Conversely, it is only when the proof of
the lesser offense requires some element
not involved in the greater offense that
the lesser would not be an included
offense (emphasis added).
-4-
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State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27, 29 (1962).
See also:

State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709 (1980);

State v. Cross, Utah, 649 P.2d 72 (1982)1 State v. Elliott,
Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982).
Again in State v. Williams, Utah, 636 P.2d 1092,
1096 (1981), this Court ruled that:
In order to be a "lesser included
offense," the elements of the lesser
offense must necessarily and always be
included within the elements of the
greater offense.
The Utah Legislature has also set forth the same
standard in Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-l-402(3)(a), which states

that an offense is a lesser included offense when "it is
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged."
Thus both Utah case law and statutes require a lesser included
offense to contain all of the elements included in the greater
offense.
Respondent contends that the offense of criminal
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary, under
Utah statutes, because the elements differ.

Utah Code Ann.,

S 76-6-202(1) describes burglary as:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent
to commit a felony or theft or commit ·an
assault on any person.
-5-
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Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-206 ( 2) (a) describes criminal trespass

as:
(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary • • •
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on
property and;
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or
injury to any person thereon or damage to
any property therein; or
(ii) Intends to commit any crime,
other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether
his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another.
While both the burglary and the criminal trespass
statutes require the actor to "enter or remain,• the intent
element in the burglary statute is the "intent to commit a
felony or theft or to commit an assault."

The intent required

to commit criminal trespass is different; it is the intent to
cause annoyance or injury to a person, or damage to property,
or to commit any crime other than a theft or felony.
Appellant analyzes this difference in the intent
elements by stating that burglary requires "a more specific
intent" (Appellant's Brief at p. 10).

Respondent contends

that appellant's analysis is incorrect for two reasons.
First, the two crimes require different specific intents; and,
second, where two separate specific intents are involved, one
cannot be more specific than the other.

-6-
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Since burglary and criminal trespass involve
different intent elements, proof of one is not proof of the
other.

In this case, the State proved that appellant

committed burglary1 however, this proof did not also establish
proof that appellant committed criminal trespass.

The State

did not introduce testimony or evidence to show that appellant
intended to annoy or harm anyone.

Instead, the evidence

presented was that appellant broke the lock on a desk, looked
through the contents and then hid when the police appeared (T.
4, 16).

Thus, the evidence introduced was intended to and did

prove the burglary charge but could not also have proved
criminal trespass.
Respondent contends that this Court has recognized
that criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of
burglary, based on the differences in the elements of the
offenses.

In State v. Hendricks, Utah, 596 P.2d 633 (1979),

the defendant claimed the jury should have been instructed on
criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary.
In that case, two windows in a building were broken and two
typewriters were moved near a window.

The defendant, who had

been hiding for an hour, was finally located in a closet.
defense was based on voluntary intoxication.

His

This Court, in

sustaining the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
criminal trespass, thought that the evidence:
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established all of the elements of
burglary but did not establish all of the
elements of criminal trespass (emphasis
added).
Id., p. 634.

In a footnote to that statement, this Court

concluded •such in and of itself precludes the giving of the
requested instructions.•

Id., p. 634.

Since the "unlawful entry or remaining" element was
clearly established in the Hendricks case, the only element
that could have differed was that of intent.

Appellant, at

page 11 of his brief, asserts that these statements quoted
above in Hendricks, supra, indicate that this Court concluded
criminal trespass was a lesser included offense to burglary.
Respondent contends that the opposite interpretation is the
logical conclusion from the Hendricks holding since this
Court's reason for refusing to require an instruction on
criminal trespass was that the elements of criminal trespass
were not established.
Appellant makes an additional claim that because
criminal trespass and burglary are in the same part of the
Code, it can be inferred that criminal trespass is a lesser
included offense of burglary.

However, the offense involving

possession of burglary tools is also located in the same
section of the Code, yet this Court has held that it is not an
included offense to burglary.
184 (1978).

State v. Sumter, Utah, 550 P.2d

Thus, it is incorrect to infer that offenses are

lesser included offenses merely by their position in the Code.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant cites three cases to support his theory
that criminal trespass in Utah is a lesser included offense of
burglary, Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1976): People v.
Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 359 N.E.2d 1357 (1976): and
Commonwealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975).

These cases

are not applicable to the facts herein.
In Day v. State, supra, the criminal trespass
statute differs significantly from the Utah statute.

The

Texas statute does not contain any of the specific intent
provisions required by the Utah statute.

Moreover, the test

for giving lesser included instructions is less rigorous in
Texas than in Utah and an instruction thereon in Texas may
have been obligatory.
The criminal trespass statute in People v.
Henderson,_supra, is also dissimilar.to Utah's statute.
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., Book 39,

§§

140.05, 140.10, reveal that no specific intent element exists
in the New York statute.
Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, indicates that
Pennsylvania's criminal trespass statute proscribes only
unlicensed or unprivileged entry into a building or occupied
structure;

Thus, the elements of intent present in the Utah

criminal trespass statute are absent from the Pennsylvania
statute.
Since the elements of the two offenses are not the
same, proof of one is not proof of the other, and each offense
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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can be committed. without committing the other, criminal
trespass is simply not an included offense in burglary.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in refusing to grant
appellant's requested instruction on criminal trespass.
B.

APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS WERE
NOT WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED.

The trial court denied appellant's requested jury
instructions on criminal trespass because they were not
justified by the evidence (R. 34).

This Court, in State v.

Close, 28 Utah 2a 144, 499 P.2d 287, 288 (1972), determined
that instructions on lesser included offenses should be given
"when such a conviction would be warranted by any reasonable
view of the evidence • • • • " (emphasis added).

In State v.

McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971), this Court, in
discussing when lesser included offense instructions are
warranted, stated that a party is justified in receiving the
instruct ions:
• • • only where there is some reasonable
basis in the evidence to justify the
giving of such instructions (emphasis
added).
Id., p. 891.

Thus, even if criminal trespass were a lesser

included offense of burglary, an instruction would only be
warranted if based on a reasonable view of the evidence.
-10-
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In addition, Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-1-402(4) requires

jury instructions on lesser included offenses only if there is
a rational basis for acquitting a defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
Respondent contends that in viewing the evidence,
there is simply no reasonable basis upon which a finding that
appellant was guilty of criminal trespass could be based.
Appellant climbed a chain link fence, broke a window, and
entered the gas station in the early morning hours.

Nearby

neighbors called the police when they heard appellant enter
the building and the police arrived within a few minutes.
During that short time period (approximately ten minutes),
appellant had time to locate the desk, break the lock, and
look through the contents for valuable items.

Before he had

the opportunity to take anything and escape, the police
arrived.

He then hid.

The only possible inference from this

evidence is that appellant was interrupted by the police while
in the act of committing a burglary.
In State v. Brooks, Utah, 631 P.2d 878 (1981) the
trial court refused to reduce the charge from burglary to
criminal· trespass (but did give a jury instruction on criminal
trespass).

In that case, the defendant entered the apartment

through a window, turned off the power switch, apparently
moved some jewelry (rings), and left quickly, taking nothing
with him.

This Court found that the trial court did not err
-11-
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in refusing to reduce the charge to criminal trespass based
upon the evidence of the late hour and defendant's sudden
flight.

However, the instruction on criminal trespass was

warranted in that case because the defendant did not take
anything although he had access to jewelry.
In this case, however, appellant merely had no time
to take anything.

If he had not broken into the desk, or had

left without taking anything, the evidence might support an
instruction on criminal

trespass~

but the evidence herein only

supports a burglary charge and not a charge based on criminal
trespass.
In addition, respondent contends that appellant did
not base his defense on criminal trespass and therefore no
instruction was necessary on this theory.

To commit criminal

trespass, appellant must have intended to cause annoyance or
injury to any person or damage to any property or have
intended to commit any crime other than theft or a felony.
Since appellant broke into the station at about 3:00 a.m.,
when the building was obviously dark and deserted, it is
unlikely that he intended to annoy or harm anyone.

As to

damaging property, the only damage he did was to a window (to
enter) and to a desk lock (which was in furtherance of
burglary and not as an end in itself).
not contend that he

~lanned

In addition, he does

another crime.

He allegedly only

wanted a place to sleep.
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant's friend, Poul Jensen, testified
concerning appellant's alcohol consumption and activities
before the burglary.

Appellant's counsel asked Mr. Jensen

questions concerning appellant's "hyperactivity• and he did
state that appellant might want to •cause some trouble or
something like that" (T. 171).

However, on cross-examination

Mr. Jensen admitted that appellant had not suggested that they
do anything after leaving the last bar and amended his answer,
stating "not so much cause trouble.
(T. 177).

Look for something to do"

Thus, even appellant's own witness' testimony did

not present a defense based on criminal trespass.
Incidentally, appellant's witness does not bolster appellant's
defense of looking for a place to sleep since the witness said
appellant was "hyperactive" when drinking •.
Appellant also claims that this case is similar to
other cases in which the charge of burglary was reduced to
criminal trespass, based on insufficient evidence.

Appellant

cites Crawford v. State, 241 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1968)7 State v.
Rood, 11 Ariz. App. 102, 462 P.2d 399 (1969), and State v.
Kahinu, 53 Hawaii 646, 500 P.2d 747 (1972), to support his
proposition.

However, these cases are factually

"t:3:l.stinguishable and support the proposition that felonious
intent in a burglary case may be established by circumstantial
evidence.
In Crawford v. State, supra, there was no evidence
that the garage where defendant was found hiding contained any
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property.

In addition there were several broken windows

through which appellant could have entered without using
force.

Under these facts, the court determined that the

evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of burglary
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, it was insufficiency of the

evidence and not the use of circumstantial evidence which
precluded conviction.

In fact, the Court stated that:

we agree with the appellee [the state]
• • • that intent may be established by
inference from the circumstances
surrounding an act.
Id. at 797.
In State v. Rood, supra, the facts of the case again
irrlicated that the entry was not forced (into an unlocked
building).

Although this entry was insufficient to establish

felonious intent the court stated that •proof of intent can be
shown by circumstantial evidence,• Id. at 400, and •criminal
intent is usually proven by circumstantial evidence.•

Id. at

401.
Similarly, in State v. Kanihu, supra, the evidence
tended to show the motel room in which the appellant entered
was unlocked.

The room had been previously occupied by the

defendant's girlfriend.

Also, the defendant's flight from the

room was justified by the evidence that appellant suffered
from paranoia as a result of L.S.D. use.

These facts led the

court to find that the defendant lacked the requisite intent
-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to commit burglary.

However, the court recognized that:

Intent in a burglary case can be
established by inference from the
surrounaing circumstances and accompanying
and attendant acts of the person accused.
Id. at 749.

Thus, these cases are not similar to this case

because the evidence in those cases raised a close factual
question concerning intent while in this case, the evidence
strongly supports an inference that appellant's only intent
was to commit a burglary.

Since appellant's theory of

criminal trespass is not supported by any evidence, the trial
court correctly ref used to instruct the jury on criminal
trespass, whether as a lesser included offense or simply the
appellant's-theory of the case.
Even if appellant was entitled to jury instructions
on criminal trespass, any trial court error was not
prejudicial in this case.

The appellant claims that his

rights were prejudiced because, in deciding whether any
evidence supported the intent element of criminal trespass,
the trial court allegedly usurped the jury's function.
Respondent contends that the jury, in its proper
role, indeed did determine the question of intent.

Both

appellant's-and the State's closing arguments centered on this
element, carefully informing the jury that it must determine
the question of appellant's intent (T. 190, 191, 197, 200-203,
209).

The jury instructions also emphasized that the jury was
-15-
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required to determine appellant's intent (R. 75, 77).

Thus,

the jury's attention was focused on determining appellant's
intent, which, in order to convict, had to be the specific
intent to commit a felony or theft.
In this case the jury properly inferred intent from
appellant's acts:

breaking and entering, breaking into a

desk, and hiding.

State v. Baldwin, 29 Utah 2d 318, 509 P.2d

350 (1973) involved similar facts.

Police officers observed

the defendants entering a building at 1:00 a.m.

They saw the

defendants walk in and out of off ices, and arrested them as
they left the building.

The officers found that some desk

drawers had been rifled and articles removed and left in
dissaray~

however, the only items found on the defendants were

lock pick tools.

This Court found that the "failure to steal

after entering with the intent is no defense to the crime of
burglary."

Id. at 351.

Thus, although appellant did not take

anything, the jury in its proper role inferred that his intent
was to commit a felony or a theft.
The jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
appellant's guilt, and the conviction is supported by the
evidence.

Thus, since there is no real evidence (beyond

appellant's counsel's theory) of criminal trespass, the jury's
verdict should be upheld.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case did not warrant a jury
instruction, and the trial court properly refused to give
appellant's requested instructions on criminal trespass.
Thus, whether criminal trespass is an included offense of
burglary is immaterial since the evidence did not support it
as appellant's theory of the case either as a lesser included
offense or as a separate defense.
Respectfully submitted this
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